Due to the publicly-known deterministic characteristic of pilot tones, pilot-aware attack, by jamming, nulling and spoofing pilot tones, can significantly paralyze the uplink channel training in large-scale MISO-OFDM systems. To solve this, we in this paper develop an independencechecking coding based (ICCB) uplink training architecture for one-ring scattering scenarios allowing for uniform linear arrays (ULA) deployment. Here, we not only insert randomized pilots on subcarriers for channel impulse response (CIR) estimation, but also diversify and encode subcarrier activation patterns (SAPs) to convey those pilots simultaneously. The coded SAPs, though interfered by arbitrary unknown SAPs in wireless environment, are qualified to be reliably identified and decoded into the original pilots by checking the hidden channel independence existing in subcarriers. Specifically, an independence-checking coding (ICC) theory is formulated to support the encoding/decoding process in this architecture. The optimal ICC code is further developed for guaranteeing a wellimposed estimation of CIR while maximizing the code rate. Based on this code, the identification error probability (IEP) is characterized to evaluate the reliability of this architecture. Interestingly, we discover the principle of IEP reduction by exploiting the array spatial correlation, and prove that zero-IEP, i.e., perfect reliability, can be guaranteed under continuouslydistributed mean angle of arrival (AoA). Besides this, a novel closed form of IEP expression is derived in discretely-distributed case. Simulation results finally verify the effectiveness of the proposed architecture.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security paradigms in wireless communications has attracted increasing attention with the evolution of air interface technology towards the requirements of future 5G networks [1] . In those envisioned scenarios, multiple existing technologies, such as orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM), are closely integrated with novel innovative attempts, such as large-scale multiple-antenna technique or namely massive multiple-input, multiple-output (Massive MIMO) [2] . And the phenomenon accompanied by is that the imperishable characteristic of wireless channels, such as the open and shared nature, have always been rendering those air interface technologies vulnerable to growing security attacks [3] - [7] , including the denial of service (DoS) attacks and tampering attacks, among others. As a major manner of DoS attack, jamming attacks, in a variety of behaviors out of control, have exhibited its astonishing destructive power on those existing and emerging air interface techniques [8] .
A very typical example is that OFDM systems under largescale antenna arrays are very suspectable to the protocolaware attack, a well-directed attack that can sense the specific protocols and intensify the effectiveness of attack by jamming a physical layer mechanism instead of data payload directly. As a typical protocol-aware attack, pilotaware attack could hinder the regular channel training between legitimate transceiver pair. This is done, in theory, by jamming/nulling/spoofing the deterministic pilot tones which are known and shared on the time-frequency resource grid (TFRG) by all parties for channel acquisition [9] - [12] . That is to say, pilot-aware attack could embrace three flexible modes, i.e., pilot tone jamming (PTJ) attack [10] , pilot tone nulling (PTN) attack [11] and pilot tone spoofing (PTS) attack [12] . As an example of PTS attack in narrow-band single-carrier systems, pilot contamination (PC) attack was first introduced and analysed by [13] . Following [13] , many research have been investigated on the advantage of large-scale multiantenna arrays on defending against PC attack [14] - [16] . However, those studies were limited to the attack detection by exploiting the physical layer information, such as auxiliary training or data sequences [14] , [15] and some prior-known channel information [16] .
The first attempt to resolve pilot aware attack was proposed for a conventional OFDM systems in [17] , that is, transforming the PTN and PTS attack into PTJ attack by randomizing the locations and values of regular pilot tones on TFRG. Assuming the independent subcarriers, authors in [12] proposed a frequency-domain subcarrier (FS) channel estimation framework under the PTS attack by exploiting pilot randomization and independence component analysis (ICA). One key problem is that the practical subcarriers are not mutually independent in the scenarios with limited channel taps, and thus ICA does not apply in this case. What's most important is that the influence of SAPs on CIR estimation was not evaluated. Actually, when the so-called optimal code is adopted, its CIR estimation is extremely illimposed and unprecise.
This further motives us to provide a secure large-scale multi-antenna OFDM systems, with some necessary consideration, i.e., array spatial correlation, and redesign the overall pilot sharing process during the uplink channel training phase. Most importantly, we have to redesign the supporting CIR estimation process. Before that, we have to admit that the pilot randomization technique, though necessary for resolving pilot-aware attack, brings to the process two bottlenecks, i.e., unpredictable attack modes and non-recoverable pilot information covered by random wireless channels. Basically, an efficient hybrid attack is more likely to be the following:
Problem 1 (Attack Model). An attacker in hybrid attack mode can choose either PTJ mode or silence cheating (SC) mode for intentional information hiding as well.
On the other hand, we could further identify the second bottleneck as follows:
Problem 2. Randomized pilots, if utilized for uplink channel training through wireless channels, cannot be separated, let alone identified.
This issue refers to three fundamental concepts which are respectively recognized as pilot conveying, separation and identification in this paper. Here, the innovative methodology we introduce is: Selectively activate and deactivate the OFD-M subcar-riers and create various SAP candidates. Diversify SAPs to encode pilots and reuse those coded subcarriers carrying pilot information, to estimate the uplink channels simultaneously. In what follows, the main contributions of this paper are summarized:
First, a deterministic and precise encoding principle is established such that arbitrary SAPs can be encoded as a binary code. The ICC theory is then developed to further optimize the code such that arbitrary two codewords in the code, if being superimposed on each other, can be separated and identified reliably. Furthermore, an optimal ICC codebook is formulated with the maximum code rate while guaranteeing a well-imposed CIR estimation. Based on this code, a reliable ICCB uplink training architecture is finally built up by constructing an one-to-one mapping/demapping relationship between pilots, codewords and SAPs.
We further characterize the reliability of this architecture as the identification error probability (IEP) and discover a hidden phenomenon that when subcarrier estimations are performed on the basis of this architecture, the array spatial correlation existing in the subcarriers overlapped from the legitimate node and the attacker can further reduce IEP. It can be proved that zero IEP cannot be achieved only when the attacker is located in the clusters with the same mean AoA as the legitimate node. This principle, in theory, could facilitate the acquisition of the position of Ava. If we consider the mean AoA with continuous distribution, the reliability, in this sense, can be perfectly guaranteed. Otherwise, for a practical discrete distribution model, we again show how much the reliability could be further reinforced.
The rest of the paper is summarized as follows. In section II, we present an overview of pilot-aware attack on multi-antenna OFDM systems. In Section III, we introduce an ICCB uplink training architecture. Channel estimation and identification enhancement is described in Section IV. Numerical results are presented in Section V and finally we conclude our work in Section VI.
II. OVERVIEW OF PILOT-AWARE ATTACK ON
MULTI-ANTENNA OFDM SYSTEMS In this section, we will provide a basic overview of pilot-aware attack by introducing three basic configurations, including the system and signal model. Under this background, we will then review the influence of a common-sense technique, i.e., pilot randomization, on the pilot-aware attack and identify the existing key impediments.
A. System Description
We consider an synchronous large-scale MISO-OFDM system with a T ≫ 1-antenna base station (named as Alice) and a single-antenna legitimate user (named as Bob). As shown in Fig. 1 , the based station (BS) with angle spread Δ is equipped with a -spacing directive ULA and placed at the origin along the -axis to serve a 120degree sector that is centered around the -axis ( = 0). We assume that no energy is received for angles /
. Furthermore, we consider the wide-band one-ring scattering model for which Bob is surrounded by local scatterers within [ 1 − Δ, 1 + Δ] [18] . 1 represents the mean AoA of clusters surrounding Bob.
In this system, pilot-tone based uplink channel training process is considered in which available subcarriers indexed by Ψ are provided during each available OFDM symbol time. In principle, B subcarriers indexed by Ψ B = { 0 , 1 , . . . , B −1 } are employed for pilot tone insertion and the following channel estimation. A singleantenna malicious node (named as Ava) then aims to disturb this training process by jamming/spoofing/nulling those pilot tones. We denote the set of victim subcarriers by Ψ A = { 0 , 1 , . . . , A −1 } where A denotes the number of victim subcarriers. We make the following assumption: Assumption 1. Ava is surrounded by local scatterers within [ 2 − Δ, 2 + Δ] and has the overlapping AoA intervals with Bob, this is,
Here, 2 denotes the mean AoA of clusters surrounding Ava. This assumption is supported by the scenario in [18] .
B. Receiving Signal Model
To begin with, we denote pilot tones of Bob and Ava at the -th subcarrier and -th symbol time, respectively by
, ∈ Ψ B for low overhead consideration and theoretical analysis. Alternatively, we can superimpose B [ ] onto a dedicated pilot sequence optimized under a nonsecurity oriented scenario. At this point, can be an additional phase difference for security consideration. We do not constraint the strategies of pilot tones of Ava such that
Let us proceed to the basic OFDM procedure. First, the frequency-domain pilot signals of Bob and Ava over subcarriers are respectively stacked as by 1 vectors
T ∈Ψ . Here there exist: 
where H C,B and H C,A are × circulant matrices for which the first column of H C,B and H C,A are respectively given by
Here, h B ∈ ℂ ×1 and h A ∈ ℂ ×1 are CIR vectors, respectively from Bob and Ava to the -th receive antenna of Alice.
is the AWGN vector at theth antenna and -th symbol time Taking FFT, Alice finally derives the frequency-domain by 1 signal vector at the -th receive antenna and -th OFDM symbol time as [19] . For each path, CIRs of different antennas are assumed to be spatially correlated. In one-ring scattering scenarios, the correlation between the channel coefficients of antennas 1 ≤ , ≤ T , ∀ can be defined by [18] :
Here, R represents the channel covariance matrix of Bob if = 1 and Ava otherwise. R 1 , instead of R 2 , is known by Alice. The estimation models of FS channels under pilotaware attack can be seen in [10] . We do not specify this concept here.
C. Influence of Pilot Randomization on Pilot-Aware Attack
To defend against pilot-aware attack, the commonsense is that Bob shall randomize its own pilot tones. In practice, the randomization of pilot tone values is employed. More specifically, each of the candidate pilot phases is mapped into a unique quantized samples, chosen from the set , defined In what follows, we make the following assumption for Bob for the sake of theoretical analysis: Assumption 3. During two adjacent OFDM symbol time, such as, , +1 , ≥ 0, two pilot phases and +1 are kept with fixed phase difference, that is,
Here, +1 and are both random but are deterministic and publicly known.
As discussed in the Introduction part, a fact is that randomized pilots, if utilized for uplink channel training through wireless channels, cannot be separated, let alone identified.
III. ICCB UPLINK TRAINING ARCHITECTURE
In view of above issues, we in this section aim to construct a novel pilot sharing mechanism, logically including pilot conveying, pilot separation and pilot identification. Each procedure can be found in Algorithm 1 and Fig. 2 .
A. Pilot Conveying via Binary Code on Code-Frequency Domain
1) Binary Code: The Eq. (40) in [20] provides a decision threshold function Δ = ( T , ), for measuring how many antennas on one subcarrier are required to achieve a certain probability of false alarm. Here we consider three symbol time and a 3 × T receiving signal matrix is created for detection. Under this requirement, we try to build up a relationship between SAPs with the common binary code. Before that, we have the following definition: Definition 1. One subcarrier can be precisely encoded if, for any > 0, there exists a positive number ( ) such that, for all ≥ ( ),
is smaller than .
We should note that ( T , ) is a monotone decreasing function of two independent variables T and . For a given probability constraint * , we could always expect a lower bound ( * ) of possible thresholds such that ( * ) = ( T , * ) is satisfied. Under this equation, we could flexibly configure T and ( * ) to make * approach zero [20] . We also find that the that achieves zero-is decreased with the increase of antennas. Basically, this phenomenon originates from the fact that the increased dimension makes the eigenvalues of noise matrix to be more concentrated in a narrow interval, which is determined by the well-known Marcenko-Pastur Law [21] .
2) Code Frequency Domain: Based on Definition 1, we can encode the -th subcarrier as a binary digit according to: = { 1 if there exist signals 0 ℎ
Algorithm 1 Pilot Conveying, Separation and Identification 1: Pilot Conveying 1) Insert one phase that is selected from set , onto subcarriers at the initial OFDM symbol, for instance defined by 0 . The phases of pilot signals inserted in adjacent OFDM symbols, such as , ≥ 1 obey the Assumption 3.
2) Construct an one-to-one mapping from the phases in set to codewords of binary codebook matrix derived in Section III-A, and then further to SAPs. Select one phase, i.e., the phase at 0 , for pattern activation. The specific principle is that pilot signals are transmitted on the -th subcarrier if the -th digit of the codeword is equal to 1, otherwise this subcarrier is kept unoccupied. 2: Pilot Separation Alice detects the available subcarriers to acquire the superimposed SAPs using the detection technique shown in [20] . Then Alice decodes those superimposed SAPs and derives two individual codewords by using the inner-product based differential decoding proposed in [12] . 3: Pilot Identification Separated codewords that satisfy Theorem 1 are qualified to be identified and then demapped into the pilot phases in for recovering the pilot signals of Bob.
Meanwhile, let us denote a set of binary code vectors by with = { s| ∈ {0, 1} , 1 ≤ ≤ } where denotes the maximum length of the code. Then, a code frequency domain could be constructed as a set of pairs (s, ) with s ⊂ and 1 ≤ ≤ B where is an integer representing the subcarrier index of appearance of the code. This can be depicted in Fig. 2 .
3) Binary Codebook Matrix: On the formulated codefrequency domain, we group the binary digits and construct the binary code by presenting a binary codebook as follows: Based on this definition, we also define a superposition principle between codewords by the following: Definition 3. The superposition sum z = x y (designated as the digit-by-digit Boolean sum) of two codewords denoted by x = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , B ) ⊂ C and y = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , B ) ⊂ C is defined by:
where denotes the -th element of vector z.
Based on above preparations, the pilot conveying process can be shown in Algorithm 1.
B. Pilot Separation and Identification Via ICC
The study of how to optimize the previous binary codebook such that it can separate and identify codewords from the disturbed codeword is called ICC theory, including the encoding principle and decoding principle.
1) Encoding Principle: We introduce the concept ofoverlapping code with constant weight by defining: Definition 4. A B × binary matrix C is called a ICC-( B , ) code of length B and order , if for any column set such that | | = 2, there exist at least a set of rows such that , = 1, ∀ , , ∈ , ∈ .
In this principle, we can know that any two codewords in C must overlap with each other on at least non-zero digits. Here and in the following section, we assume the ratio of two integers is always kept to be an integer without loss of generality. Based on the theorem, we can derive the number of codewords or namely the columns in C, by a binomial coefficient =
. Therefore, we have:
, is calculated as
Theorem 2. The optimal ICC-( B , ) code maximizing the code rate holds when = . In this case, the reliability measured by IEP is given by
2) Decoding Procedure: The related technique in this part is same with that in Fig. 3 of [12] . We do not specify this.
The overall process can be shown in Algorithm 1.
IV. CHANNEL ESTIMATION AND IDENTIFICATION
ENHANCEMENT In this section, we continue our design work and focus on the channel estimation phase.
A. FS Channel Estimation
We consider two OFDM symbol time, i.e., 0 and 1 and , ≥ 1 randomly-overlapping subcarriers. We could get two confusing pilot vectors defined by
] T and
] T . The randomness means their random positions of carrier frequency. Then the signals received on overlapping subcarriers within 0 and 1 are stacked as the 2 × T matrix Y L , equal to
where X L is denoted by a 2 × 2 matrix satisfying
. F L, is the -row matrix for which each index of rows belongs to the set that is defined by
Now we turn to the procedure of channel estimation. First, x L,1 and x L,2 , are deemed as the candidate weight vectors for estimating. We then consider the sample covariance matrix given by The estimated versions of FS channels are respectively derived asĥ
The normalized mean square error (NMSE) for the t- 
. Identification Enhancement
Since Bob could get two confusing pilots and two confusing estimated channels, we model the process of identification enhancement as a decision between two hypothesis:
For simplicity, we define the eigenvalue decomposition:
The rank of R and R F are respectively denoted by and f = min { , }. To identify the two hypothesis, we build up the error decision function as Δ
where the function satisfies (r) = r (
The function can be simplified by the following theorem: Theorem 3. When T → ∞, the error decision function can be simplified as:
Examining this equation, we could find the pilot scheduling strategies of Ava across subcarriers do not affect the decision function. In what follows, we try to further acquire the characteristic of Δ from the observation of R 1 and R 2 .
1) Hints Derived from Spatial Correlation: The authors in [18] pointed out that the set of eigenvalues of R and the set of uniformly spaced samples { ( / T ) : = 0, . . . , T − 1} are asymptotically equally distributed. And the channel covariance eigenvectors U , i.e., T × matrix U , can be approximated with a submatrix of the DFT matrix F. Here, denotes the support of ( ). Backing to the Eq. (17), the trace function satisfies Tr (
where Λ ,p and Λ ,p are respectively
As previously discussed, we approximate U H 2 U 1 using F H 2 F 1 and define 1 ∩ 2 = 3 . We then discuss the influence of 3 on Tr
.
and have
Tr (
This is because the eigenvectors labeled by the indexes out of the interacted set 3 are mutually orthogonal [18] . Then we have the following theorem: 2) IEP Reduction: Inspired by the above result, we know that the identification error happens only when 1 = 2 .
Theorem 5. Under the assumption of mean AoA obeying continuous probability distribution (CPD), the IEP I in Eq. (9) is updated to be zero. Under the assumption of mean AoA obeying distrete probability distribution (DPD), for instance, uniform distribution with interval length , the IEP I in Eq. (9) is updated to be I .
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we further carry out the performance evaluation concerning above techniques mentioned.
In this part, we aim to verify the feasibility of Theorem 4 through simulations shown in Fig. 3(a) where the strength of Δ is plotted against , = 1, 2 by configuring T = 100 and = 5. In this simulation, we consider that the candidate samples of discrete mean AoAs lie within the set { − 4 , − 7 , 0, − 7 , − 4 } . Based on the estimation in Eq. (10) and the correlation model in Eq. (4), we derive the corresponding examples of Δ . As we can see, the identification error happens when Δ = 0, that is, 1 = 2 . In this sense, we could envision that IEP is zero under assumption of mean AoA with CPD.
For the sake of a comprehensive analysis, we consider the DPD model for mean AoA and further simulate the IEP performance in Fig. 3(b) . The mean AoA is discretely and uniformly distributed in a length-interval. As shown in this figure, the performance of IEP is plotted versus the length of B under different number of channel taps. We consider to be from 7 to 13 and to be 20. , related to B , satisfies B = 2 + 1. As we can see, even with small subcarrier overheads, that is, B is small, the IEP can be low and our architecture has a very reliable performance guarantee. Moreover, we can find that when is low, such as = 7, the IEP has a maximum value after which IEP decreases with the increase of B . With the increase of , IEP decreases monotonically with B . Furthermore, the initial value of determines the upper bound IEP can achieve. With the increase of , the upper bound decreases.
Finally, we simulate the performance of channel estimation in Fig. 3(c) in which the NMSE is plotted versus SNR of Bob under different number of antennas. and B are respectively configured to be 6 and 256. Here, we consider the estimation shown in Eq. (10) and assume perfect identification for attacks. We do not consider the case where there is no attack since in this case LS estimator is a natural choice. For the simplicity of comparison, we only present the channel estimation under PTS attack because the estimation error floor under PTN and PTJ attack can be easily understood to be very high. The binned scheme proosed in [17] is simulated as an another comparison scheme. As we can see, PTS attack, if happens, causes a high-NMSE floor on CIR estimation for Bob. This phenomenon can also be seen in the binned scheme. However, the estimation in our proposed framework breaks down this floor and its NMSE gradually decreases with the increase of transmitting antennas.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigated the issue of pilot-aware attack on the uplink channel training process in large-scale MISO-OFDM systems. We proposed a secure ICCB uplink training architecture in which pilot tones, usually exposed in public, are now enabled to be shared between legitimate transceiver pair under hybrid attack environment. We developed a novel coding theory to support and secure this pilot sharing process, and found an optimal code rate to finally provide the wellimposed CIR estimation. Theoretically, we verified an important fact that this architecture could perfectly secure pilot sharing against the attack if the CPD model of mean AoA was considered. In practical scenarios with DPD model of mean AoA, this architecture could also bring a high-reliability and high-precision CIR estimation.
